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RECENT DECISIONS

NEGLIGENCE-IMMUNITY

oF

CHARITABLE

!NsTITUTIONS

FROM

Su1T-

A patient of defendant charitable hospital died as a result of the transfusion
of an incorrect blood type and it was shown that one of defendant's employees
had correctly typed the blood but negligently mislabeled it. The widower
and children of the deceased brought an action in negligence for damages
and the circuit court allowed recovery. On appeal, held, affirmed. The defendant hospital is liable in damages for the death of the deceased caused
by the negligence of its employee notwithstanding the fact that defendant
is a charitable institution and that the hospital authorities exercised due
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care and caution in employing and retaining said employee. Mississippi

Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, (Miss. 1951) 55 S. (2d) 142.
The law as regards immunity of charitable institutions from actions for
damages for injuries to beneficiaries by the negligence of employees has
been in a state of flux for the past few decades. 1 It is believed, however,
that the principal case represents a comparatively recent trend against the
doctrine of immunity formulated before the tum of the century.2 Several
theories have been advanced to justify such immunity. The three most
prevalent are the so-called "trust fund" theory, based on the idea that the
funds 9f a charitable institution are held in trust for purposes of the charity
only and, therefore, cannot be used to satisfy tort judgments;3 the "waiver"
or "acceptance of benefits" theory, based on the fiction that one who enters
a charitable institution and accepts the benefits conferred thereby waives
all claims against such institution for injuries caused by the negligence of
its employees;4 and the public policy doctrine which holds that the general
public welfare is promoted by granting immunity to charitable institutions.5
Other theories are the public function theory, by which the charity is said
to be entitled to the immunity of a sovereign,6 and the theory that the
doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to charitable institutions
because their employees are not working for the profit of such institutions.7
The majority of states, following one or the other of these doctrines, grant
immunity to charitable institutions for injuries caused to patients by the
negligence of the employees, unless it can be shown that the injury was a
result of a failure on the part of the institutional authorities to exercise due
care in selecting the negligent employee.8 The doctrine of immunity stemmed
from the leading American cases of McDonald v. Massachusetts General

1 See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, (D.C. Cir. 1942)
130 F. (2d) 810, for a comprehensive analysis of the confusion in this field at that time.
2 These theories were severely criticized by leading textbook writers on the law of torts
and the trends away from them noted. See PROSSER, ToRTS 1079 et seq. (1941); 3 Sco'IT,
TRUSTS §402 (1939); HARPER, TORTS §294 (1933).
s Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1884); McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876); Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42
(1894); Parks v. Northwestern University, 121 ill. App. 512, affd. 218 ill. 381, 75 N.E.
991 (1905); 10 AM. JUR. §146 (1939).
4Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 P. 1008 (1918); Mikoto v.
Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N.W. 219 (1918); 10 AM. JUR. §145 (1939).
5 Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914); Magnuson v.
Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 169 P. 829 (1918); Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898 (1910); 10 AM. JUR. §147 (1939).
6 Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1916); University of Louisville
v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907); 10 AM. JUR. §148 (1939).
7 Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 A. 595 (1895); Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Assn., 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911); Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N.C.
594, 83 S.E. 807 (1914); 10 AM. JUR. §150 (1939).
s See annotation in 133 A.L.R. 821 at 825 (1941); 10 AM. JUR. §144 (1939).
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Hospital 0 and Perry v. House of Refuge10 which were in turn based on two
English cases,11 which had been overruled previous to the American decisions.12 Thus from the beginning the American doctrine of immunity was
on an insecure footing. At first most of the courts in the United States
followed the two leading cases with little thought or reason.13 As time went
on, however, and cases arose in jurisdictions hitherto untouched by the
problem, the theory of immunity underwent more careful scrutiny. The
result was confusion, for while many of these courts seemed to feel that
immunity was desirable, they tended to pick out one theory and dismiss
the others with severe criticism, thus in toto presenting various reasons
why none of the theories was tenable. 14 The end result has been a reexamination by most courts of the whole question of immunity, from which
two trends have emerged. The first has occurred in states following the
"trust fund" theory. Most of these states have now decided that if the
charity has liability insurance or funds not held in trust it may be held liable
for the negligence of its employees, at least as to paying patients, to the
extent of such funds.15 This innovation may be illogical,16 but it is indicative
of the desire of such courts to limit the immunity without completely overthrowing their past decisions. The second and more general trend is that
noted and followed in the principal case. It is that charitable institutions
will be held liable for injuries caused to paying patients through the negligence of their employees.17 The latter trend is so strong that several courts
have gone so far as to overrule past decisions, as did the Mississippi court
in this case.18 Several other courts, facing the question for the first time,
o 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
20 (1884).
Hospital v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1848); Holiday v. St.
Leonard, 11 C.B.N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
12 Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital, [1909] 2 K.B. 820; Mersey Docks v. Gibbs,
[1866] L.R. 1 H.L. 93, according to comment in Foreman v. Canterbury, [1871] L.R. 6
Q.B. 214.
13 See for example the case of St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E.
537 (1924).
14 Bruce v. Young Men's Christian Assn., 51 Nev. 372, 277 P. 798 (1929); Weston,
Aclmx. v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921); Southern
Methodist Hospital & Sanatorium v. Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P. (2d) 458 (1938).
15 Moore v. Moyle, 405 ill. 555, 92 N.E. (2d) 81 (1950); Vanderbilt University v.
Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938); O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Assn., 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. (2d) 835 (1939).
10 See 26 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 115 (1950).
17 Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E. (2d) 28
(1937); Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 S. 344 (1940); Sisters
of the Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P. (2d) 996 (1938).
1 8 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. (2d) 220 (1950); Malloy v.
Fong, 37 Cal. (2d) 356, 232 P. (2d) 241 (1951); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Assn.,
241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. (2d) 151 (1950). It is interesting to note that New York, after
much deliberation over a period of years, finally reached the conclusion in the Sheehan case,
supra note 16, that there would be liability for the negligence of all employees except doc10 63 Md.
11 Heriot's
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refuse immunity whether the patient is paying or not.19 The opinions in
cases following this trend carefully examine and discard as untenable the
many theories advanced in justification of immunity. The second trend seems
logical in the light of the general theories of negligence which were developed by our English predecessors in the early days of the law. It is submitted, however, that there remains a strong policy reason for protecting
charitable institutions from liability to direct beneficiaries, i.e., non-paying
patients, for the negligence of its employees.

W. Garrett Flickinger, S.Ed.

tors and nurses, who were to be regarded as independent contractors so that the hospital
could not be held responsible for their negligence. For a thorough discussion of New York
law see "Tort Liability of Hospitals in New York," 37 CoRN. L.Q. 419 (1952).
19 Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, (Del. 1951) 83 A. (2d) 753; Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. (2d) 230 (1950); President and Directors
of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra note 1; Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconness Hospital,
, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W. (2d) 247 (1946).

